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Legal infrastructure for cooperation as a catalyst for platooning? 
Wouter Verheyen1 
  
Abstract: Platooning could bring an important efficiency gain to road transport. In order to 
achieve such efficiency gain by means of ad hoc or on the fly platooning, a large scale 
transition to this new technology is required however. Because of this, road carriers might be 
reluctant to pioneer in this field and rather await other carriers` transformation. Thus, there 
is a significant risk that the technology will never take off. For this reason, instead of the on 
the fly platooning-model, a cooperative model of platooning seems desirable, whereby road 
carriers organize cooperative platooning-journeys. Even in the absence of a large scale 
transition, within this partnership platooning can still lead to efficiency gains. Such 
cooperation increases however transaction costs and could give rise to uncertainties as to the 
liability impact of such cooperation. For this reason, next to developing the regulatory 
framework also developing the contractual framework is an essential condition to a 
sustainable development of platooning. In this paper, based on a literature study and 
empirical research a cooperation model in proposed with rules on membership rules, daily 
operation and liability.   
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1. Problem statement & method 
1.1. Problem statement 
 
Cooperation could accelerate the introduction of platooning as it eliminates the need for a 
large scale transition for platooning to become efficient. However, cooperation gives rise to 
new challenges and there is a risk that the costs of cooperation would outweigh the benefits of 
coopetitive platooning. Such costs, among others consists of the costs of setting up the 
cooperation, the costs of cooperation and the risk connected to such cooperation. The role of 
these factors in the carriers` decision making process is evidenced by our survey, which 
establishes that a decisive role comes to most of these factors in the carriers` decision making 
process. The most important factor seems to be the uncertain liability exposure which is 
named by 83,3 % of the respondents as an important or even decisive (38,8%) factor that 
stands in the way of a transition to platooning. The second most important factor  (named by 
64% of the respondents as an important or even decisive hindrance of cooperation) are the 
investments for setting up the cooperation. The administrative burden of cooperating on the 
contrary is considered as a significant obstacle to cooperation by a much smaller number of 
respondents (36 %). The main problems as perceived by the carriers are thus the uncertain 
liability impact of platooning and the costs of setting up a cooperation. 
 
1.2. Legal context 
As the focus of this article lies with the private law aspects of platooning, e.g. the relationship 
between the parties to the platooning contract, also for what concerns the legal context we 
focus on the private law aspects. This doesn`t take away the fact that there are many public 
law (for example traffic law) hindrances to platooning. These aspects will here however not 
be investigated more in depth.  
When looking at the private law context, three different relationships can be distinguished:  1) 
the relationship between the partners to the cooperation, 2) the relationship between the leader 
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of the platoon and the following trucks in a specific transport and 3) the relationship between 
an individual carrier and its cargo interests.  
 
1.2.1. Relationship between the partners 
 
For what concerns the first relationship, no specific legislation is available. Instead, potential 
partners will need to set up their cooperation based on standard rules of contract and/ or 
company law. These questions are often governed by national law and thus different rules will 
apply depending on the applicable national law. As international platooning-partnerships are 
certainly not unrealistic (see also the example of retour container freight), this is an important 
complicating factor. What brings an even further complicating fact, is the multiparty-nature of 
platooning cooperation contracts. In many countries established case law and doctrine on 
multiparty contracts is lacking, thus adding further to uncertainty (see E. Dirix, 1981-`82 and 
I. Samoy, 2007). A common feature of commercial contract law in different countries, is 
however the fact that it is in general not mandatory and that parties can thus deviate through 
contractual stipulations. Thus parties could eliminate uncertainties and diverging answers 
depending on the applicable law by means of a contractual framework. 
 
1.2.2. Relationship between cargo interest and carrier 
 
An important exception to the supplementary nature of commercial contract law, exists in the 
field of transport law. Carriage contracts are to a large extent subject to mandatory law. 
International road transport contracts are governed by CMR. The Belgian legislator has also 
expanded the scope of CMR to national law. Platooning might have an impact on the 
application of these mandatory rules in the second and the third relationship. Insofar as this 
impact is undesirable, due to the mandatory nature it is impossible to amend the CMR rules to 
a more desirable solution.  
In the third relationship there is a direct impact of platooning (Verheyen, TBH, 2016). CMR 
provides for a presumed but limited liability with only limited exoneration grounds (article 
17.2 and 17.4 CMR) (see for a more in depth analysis of the liability system of CMR K.F. 
Haak, 1986 and M.A. Clarke, 2014). In case of intent or a fault equivalent to willful 
misconduct, the liability will be unlimited (article 29 CMR). Platooning might limit the 
possibilities of exoneration, among others because carriers cannot invoke a defect of the 
vehicle as exoneration ground (article 17.3 CMR) and because the carrier is liable for acts of 
agents and servants and other persons of whose services he makes use (article 3 CMR). The 
leader of the platoon could definitely be qualified as such person and thus his acts or 
negligence could not qualify as exoneration grounds.  Platooning could in some situations 
even be considered as a fault equivalent to willful misconduct. The latter seems however 
unlikely before Belgian and Dutch courts, because courts here held that the intent needs to 
relate to the consequences (intent to cause damage). Moreover, in Belgium, a fault equivalent 
to willful misconduct is not accepted by courts and also in the Netherlands it is rarely 
accepted (only in case the carrier is aware of the likelihood of damage). Thus the impact 
mainly lies with the potential impossibility to invoke an exoneration ground in cases where 
such defense would have been possible in case of traditional transportation.  Traffic incidents 
can for example constitute valid force majeure events, but in case such accident would follow 
from a defect of the platooning software, this defense would be excluded even if such defect 
would not lie in the own truck`s hardware. 
 
1.2.3. Relationship between leader and following truck 
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The impact of platooning on the CMR-regime has an indirect impact on the relationship 
between leader and following truck. If the following truck is liable towards his cargo interest 
for damage caused by the leader, it is desirable if he is able to recover compensation from this 
leader. Thus the liability rules should for cases where damage is attributable to the leader be 
insofar as possible back to back with the CMR rules. There is however in this second 
relationship also more direct impact of CMR possible. According to art. 1 CMR, the 
Convention applies to contracts for the carriage of goods by road by means of vehicles. In 
every specific case courts will have to decide whether this condition is fulfilled and thus 
whether CMR applies (Verheyen, Unif Law Rev, 2016). In the absence of a supreme CMR 
court, national courts have a wide discretionary margin on this point (on the evolutionary 
interpretation of Conventions, see J. Arato, 2010) . Today, in a context where the leader of the 
platoon only takes over the longitudinal control of the vehicle, it is very unlikely that a court 
would qualify a platooning contract as a contract that is governed by CMR as this doesn`t 
seem to fall within the ordinary meaning of the word carriage. If however on the longer term  
the leader also takes over the navigation of the vehicle and eventually the driver of the 
following trucks can even start taking his resting times during platooning, there is a much 
stronger case for such qualification. In such case there are strong similarities between 
platooning and carrying a shipper-owned trailer. The distinguishing element remaining is that 
while the carrier takes care of both navigation and propulsion of the trailer, in case of 
platooning, he would only take care of the navigation. While it is absolutely not necessary so 
that courts will decide to apply CMR to this relationship, it is important that there are 
arguments to make such case. If the court finds CMR applicable, the liability regime would 
automatically apply and would automatically overrule contractual stipulations between the 
parties. As this could lead to uncertainty, parties should take this into account when designing 
the cooperation agreement.  
 
1.3. Research question 
 
Taking into account the aforementioned problem, the question underlying this research is 
whether it is possible to create a general model contract for coopetitive platooning that allows 
for legal certainty and elimination of potential adverse effects of cooperation on contractual 
rights and obligations while at the same time limiting transaction costs?  
 
1.4. Method 
 
This paper concerns a part of the broader project on legal models for cooperative logistics and 
covers the second steps of the design of the platooning model, the empirical research with 
road carriers to inquire into the preferred options. These options were established based on a 
literature study of literature on 1) cargo bundling, 2) logistics standard terms and 3) 
coopetition (see the sources mentioned in the references list for an overview of the studies 
consulted in the design of the models).   Furthermore, this research makes already proposals 
for the initial design of a model contract based on these preferences. In the next steps, these 
rules will be applied to a number of practical cases and a new survey will be launched with 
road carriers to investigate whether these desired rules also lead to the desired outcomes in 
case of practical problems. After refining the model, this will then be incorporated in an 
online tool. The empirical research is still running, but this paper includes the preliminary 
data based on a sample of 68 respondents from Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Romania, Poland and Lithuania.  
 
2. Membership rules 
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When looking into the membership rules, three questions arise: 1) the possibilities for new 
members to enter the partnership and conditions hereto, 2) the possibilities for members to 
leave the partnership and conditions hereto and 3) the possibilities to exclude members from 
the partnership and conditions hereto. Here, the survey evidences that all respondents strongly 
favor an easy entrance for new members, while at the same desiring a flexible exit-possibility 
and this both for voluntary as forced exits.  
 
2.1. Entrance rules 
  
A large majority of members prefers an open membership, with 63% of respondent in favor of 
new partners being able to join the partnership at any time and an additional 30 %  in favor of 
a periodical (for example annual) reopening of the membership.  
An open membership could without a reward system trigger freerider-behavior, whereby 
carriers would await early adapters making the business case before joining themselves. For 
this reason a financial bonus for the early adapters was included as an option in the survey as 
an option. Nonetheless, here a majority of 53 % is in favor of a same distribution rule for both 
old and new members. Of the 47 % in favor of a bonus for early adapters, another 64 % is in 
favor of limiting such bonus in time.  
 
2.2. Exit rules 
 
Also when it comes to possibilities for voluntary exit, respondents are very generous to the 
carrier who desires to leave the partnerships. None of the respondents took the view that 
carriers should not be able to leave the partnership during the contract lifetime. Moreover, 
only 30 % expects the carrier who wants to leave the partnership to pay a termination fee. 
Under 15 % expect the carrier to introduce a new possible member to the partnership. A 
majority of 57 % however only expects the carrier to respect a notification period before 
withdrawing from the partnership. While such rule has as an advantage that it doesn`t make 
the choice to enter into a partnership too final for an individual partner, what could be 
dissuasive, at the same time easy exit rules endanger the sustainability of the partnership. If 
for example a large partner can step out of the partnership, the platooning cooperation might 
not be efficient any more for any of the other partners involved.   
 
 
2.3. Exclusion of members 
 
Rules on exclusion can proof to be relevant in case of conflicts within the cooperation, but 
also as a conflict avoidance mechanism in case for example continuing the partnership 
without one of the members would be more efficient for the other partners. This could follow 
from the entrance of new members with new routing possibilities. Here two questions need to 
be answered: 1) does exclusion require consensus of all members or is a simple majority vote 
sufficient and 2) will the partner only be excluded from the operational cooperation –and thus 
continue to share in the distribution of savings- or also from the partnership.  
Here, respondents are at the one hand very much in favor of low barriers for an exclusion 
(only 20 % would require unanimity). At the other hand, respondents proof to be generous 
towards the excluded partner. Only 31 % is in favor of a simple exclusion, while the other 
respondents would allow the partner to still share in the benefits. A vast majority of 82 % of 
those in favor of a profit sharing rule, would limit this however in time.  
 
3. Daily operation 
3.1. Management 
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The platooning cooperation will require a daily manager to take care of for example 
coordination of the routes, amendments to the planning and distribution of costs and benefits. 
Similar to cargo bundling management systems, three options were presented to respondents 
1) management by one individual carrier, 2) co-management by all carriers involved and 3) 
management by a neutral third party. The first option is disqualified by over 80 % of the 
respondents and is thus clearly not considered as a valid option. While the number of 
respondents considering management by an independent third party is much bigger (42% vs. 
28 %) than the number of respondents in favor of co-management, also the number of 
opponents is much bigger (21% v. 4 %). 
 
Table 1 : Preferred management structure2 
Liability Definitely not Preferably not Neutral Possibly Preferably 
1 managing 
carrier 
44% 37% 4% 11% 4% 
Co-management 
by different 
carriers 
4% 20% 20% 28% 28% 
Independent 
third party 
21% 8% 8% 21% 42% 
 
On this point we expect the case studies to bring further clarifications, as they will indicate 
the willingness of partners to take up specific tasks connected with the daily management and 
the feasibility of doing so in a cooperative way.  
 
3.2. Financial arrangements 
 
Platooning will lead to costs savings for the partners involved. However, these saving are 
bigger for the following trucks than for the leading truck. Thus if the different carrier`s truck 
do not act as the leader to the same extent, they might also to a different extent share in the 
cost savings. For this reason a sharing rule can be useful. Here, two main distribution systems 
are possible: 1) a system distributing the actual savings of all carriers involved and 2) a 
system that provides a lump sum compensation per kilometer. Only 30 % of the respondents 
prefer a system distributing the actual savings, while 52 % prefer a system with lump sum 
compensations. However a significant minority (18%) answered that a distribution model is 
not relevant at all, or even in case of gross imbalances.   
 
4. Liability 
 
When looking into the liability rules between the partners, two questions arise. The first 
concerns the liability for damage resulting from a breach of the cooperation. A typical type of 
contract breach that could be expected, is the failure to comply with the agreed departure 
time. The second question relates to the liability of the leader of the platoon for damage to 
cargo or the vehicle.  
 
4.1. Liability for breaches of the cooperation agreement 
 
Non-compliance with agreed departure times shows great similarities with situations where 
shippers or consignees cause waiting times to the carrier. For this reason the models that were 
proposed to the respondents are also very similar to the clauses on waiting times in standard 
carrier conditions (see for example article 13 FEBETRA Conditions).  There are two essential 
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options on this point: 1) imposing a duty to wait on the other carriers or allowing them to 
leave without the negligent carrier and 2) whether a compensation should be due for such 
standstill. Complicating factor compared to the traditional standstill is that here, especially in 
case of larger platoons, standstill compensation is due to several road carriers. For this reason 
a cap to the waiting time seems to be desirable. This is also evidenced by the survey. There is 
a clear preference for not including waiting times. Only 20 % considers unlimited waiting 
times as possible or preferable, while also only 45 % of respondents consider limited waiting 
times as possible or preferable. Most respondents prefer a rule that allows the other trucks to 
leave immediately. 72% of the respondents considers this as a possible or even preferable 
option, while only 5% of respondents would definitely not opt for this option. What is striking 
here is that only one third of respondents would require the negligent carrier to contribute to 
the costs of the platooning. The other carriers would thus not impose any sanction for the 
breach of contract.  
 
Table 2 : Preferred liability regime for cargo damage3 
Liability Definitely not Preferably not Neutral Possibly Preferably 
The platoon 
doesn`t leave but 
waiting times run 
20% 40% 20% 15% 5% 
The platoon 
leaves after a 
period and 
waiting times run 
20% 15% 20% 35% 10% 
The platoon can 
leave without the 
absent driver 
5% 14% 10% 43% 29% 
The platoon can 
leave without the 
absent driver 
who still has to 
contribute as if 
he were there 
14% 19% 33,3% 19% 14% 
 
Despite the preference for not imposing a compensation on the negligent carrier, in the case 
studies this point will be investigated further. Partners encounter costs by setting up a 
cooperation and the negligence of certain partners can stand in the way of this cooperation 
being efficient.  
 
4.2. Liability for damage to cargo and vehicle4 
 
Taking into account the applicability of CMR in the contract between cargo interest and 
carrier, the option that seemed desirable from the perspective of the liability exposure of the 
carrier would be to apply the CMR liability rules in the relationship between leader and 
following trucks. On the other side however, the potential liability exposure of the leader 
should not be too great, as it could take away the incentive to act as a leader. Apart from the 
applicability of CMR-rules, for this reason 3 other options were included in the survey: 1) 
knock for knock liability whereby parties all bear their own losses and agree not to start 
recourse actions against each other; 2) a fault based liability with unlimited liability in case of 
fault or negligence of the leader; 3) a fault based liability with application of the CMR limits 
in case of fault or negligence of the leader. Here, it is clear that non-liability (knock for 
knock) is preferred over fault based liability, which in turn is preferred over presumed 
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liability. Similarly, between those alternatives where the carrier could be liable, there is strong 
preference of limited liability instead of unlimited liability.  The alternatives that stand out are 
thus the knock for knock liability and a fault based liability with CMR limits.  
   
Table 3 : Preferred liability regime for cargo damage5 
Liability Definitely not Preferably not Neutral Possibly Preferably 
Knock for knock 5% 10% 20% 35% 30% 
Fault based with 
unlimited 
liability 
35% 30% 20% 10% 5% 
CMR regime 19% 19% 19% 19% 21% 
CMR in case of 
fault 
5% 19% 24% 14% 38% 
 
Taking into account the abovementioned uncertainty as to the applicability of CMR in the 
relationship between the leader and the following trucks, the fault based liability with 
applicability of the CMR-limits is desirable. If parties would incorporate a knock for knock 
liability in the contract and courts would find CMR applicable, there would be a big gap 
between the expected liability (none) and the actual liability exposure (8,33 SDR/ kg, which 
could in cases of 15 tons trucks giver rise to a liability exposure of 125.000 SDR per truck 
involved in the accident. 
Also in case of a fault based liability with application of the CMR limits, at first glance there 
seems to be a gap between the expected liability exposure and the actual liability exposure in 
case courts find CMR applicable, due to the presumed liability imposed by CMR. However, if 
the evidentiary rules of CMR are applied to the platooning context, it turns out that the 
difference between presumed and fault based liability is here very small (see more in depth: 
Verheyen, TBH, 2016). Under CMR the carrier is presumed liable for damage caused during 
the period of responsibility (article 17 CMR. In case of platooning, the follower would 
however have to establish that the damage indeed took place during this period of 
responsibility, that is after the truck entered the platoon and before he left the platoon again. 
Unless the truck is equipped with a data recorder, allowing to track the condition of the goods 
during the voyage and with this to pinpoint the actual place the damage came into existence, 
the most likely way to evidence that damage came into existence during the period of 
responsibility is by establishing that during platooning an unusual event took place which 
caused the damage to the goods. Such unusual event could then often also qualify as a fault or 
negligence of the leader.  
 
4.3. Liability in cases of ad hoc platooning 
 
As the proposed liability regime was chosen by respondent as a suitable regime for 
cooperative platooning, it also seems to be a valid model for ad hoc platooning. In case of 
cooperative platooning everyone will act as the leader and as the follower at a given moment. 
Parties thus don`t know their role in a later claim (leader or follower), what allows for a 
liability regime that provides for a balance between the interests of leader and follower.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The survey evidences that for most of the points the respondents mainly seem to want to get 
“the train on the road” instead of providing for strict rules for the partners involved. This is 
reflected in both membership rules and liability rules. First of all, there is the preference for 
an open membership, with identical distribution rules for new partners as for the original 
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partners, the flexible exit possibilities and the balanced rules on the exclusion of members. 
When it comes to liability, this preference is evidenced by the choice for leader-friendly 
liability rules in case of cargo damage and mild remedies in case of breach of other 
obligations. On this last point, this paper also evidenced that uncertainty as to the applicability 
of CMR does not necessarily need to result in legal uncertainty, insofar as through active 
contract drafting parties anticipate on such uncertainty. 
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